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It is striking the extent to which many liberals have seen themselves as figures on the margins 
of politics. This is partly an ideological issue. Of all the great ‘isms’ of the modern age, 
liberalism has had neither the historical certainty of the two great totalitarian ideologies of the 
twentieth century, nor the reassuring hierarchical logic of conservatism. Most liberals have 
agonised about how much humans can achieve and have repeatedly stressed the fallibility of 
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rational or democratic solutions, at least in comparison with more revolutionary ideologies 
like communism. But liberals’ sense of living on the margins is also a consequence of the 
context in which liberalism was born. In Europe, the spectre of the French Revolution – and, 
later, the Bolshevik Revolution – gave liberalism a specific flavour. Liberals were often keen 
on reform, but they always feared social upheaval. Time and again, liberals found themselves 
in power only to lose control of the pace of social change. In the worst cases – 1815, 1848 or 
1917 spring to mind – this put the liberal cause back by generations. For much of modern 
European history, to be a liberal was to be in a perpetual state of siege.  
Of course, one can easily raise questions about this narrative. Those on the left have 
long accused liberals of wielding far more power than they will admit. Most recently, the 
advent of an all-conquering global neoliberalism has renewed this rhetoric. Today’s self-
confessed liberals might plead marginality, but there are many Europeans who would 
disagree, as the Greek debt crisis has amply demonstrated.1 Likewise, the benign narrative of 
liberalism as a beacon of good sense and moderation in a sea of hostile ideologies has 
repeatedly run up against the rocky shores of imperialism. The zeal with which many liberals 
endorsed colonising projects in India or Algeria – and, some would argue, in Iraq or 
Afghanistan in the twenty-first century – sits uncomfortably with the idea that liberalism has 
always represented an ideology of emancipation and positive social change.2 While many of 
today’s liberals instinctively recoil at the idea that they are somehow the proponents of a 
‘predatory neoliberalism’ or apologists for ‘liberal imperialism’, the criticisms are hard to 
shake off – and perfectly legitimate. Like it or not, liberalism is a powerful presence in 
today’s political landscape. 
Indeed, it would not be much of a stretch to argue that liberalism is the only coherent 
global ideology of modern European history to have survived relatively unscathed into the 
twenty-first century. There are echoes of communism and socialism in European far-left 
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movements (Podemos, Syriza, Die Linke. . .), and there are memories of counter-
revolutionary, neo-fascist or clerical conservatism in European far-right movements (the 
Front National, Golden Dawn, Jobbik. . .) But one does not have to be in thrall to the post-
communist liberal democratic triumphalism of the 1990s to see that liberalism has remained a 
vital reference point for political parties, politicians and political culture across Europe, North 
America and beyond.3 In some countries, liberals are reticent to describe themselves as such, 
but this does not necessarily mean that liberalism is absent.4 It would be much more accurate 
to say that liberalism has expanded and adapted itself to very different contexts, even as other 
ideologies have atrophied or died. 
Yet the multiple manifestations of liberalism in contemporary politics raise difficult 
questions for scholars of liberalism, the most significant of which is how to remain analytical 
without becoming an apologist. This problem is apparent here, as the books under 
consideration take a broadly sympathetic view of liberalism. This does not mean that all the 
authors or editors are liberals, although some of them quite clearly are, simply that they 
universally approach their subject matter within a liberal framework and accept the self-
definition of liberals as marginal, but often brilliant, individuals seeking compromise in a 
dangerous world. In some cases, most obviously for the German-Jewish intellectuals that are 
the subject of Aschheim’s essays, it is a deeply flawed compromise, but nevertheless one that 
is understandable and occasionally laudable. Liberalism, as it is presented here, is an ideology 
worth protecting. 
Obviously, this particular slant means that anyone looking for a surgical dissection of 
liberal ideology or an indictment of liberal imperial arrogance is unlikely to be satisfied with 
any of these books.5 And they certainly have a tendency to make liberalism and liberals 
appear rather less controversial than they were at key moments in European history. Still, 
these five books do have the benefit of focusing our attention on a number of conceptual 
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issues. Of these, three in particular stand out: first, whether it is possible to define liberalism 
in any kind of rigorous way; second, whether there are limits to liberalism and, if so, where 
these are and, finally, whether there is any fundamental difference between ‘liberalism’ and 
‘neoliberalism’. The authors in question do not give consistent answers to these questions, 
but the questions themselves are all vital to the study of liberalism. It therefore seems 
appropriate to deal with each one in turn – both as a way of assessing the contribution of each 
book to the existing literature and as a way of exploring the geographical and conceptual 
limitations of the field. 
 
The Many Meanings of Liberalism 
The question of how to define liberalism is one that has preoccupied generations of scholars. 
Most concur that liberalism involves some mix of individual liberty, rational projects for 
political reform, a belief in emancipation and a certain idea of human civilisation, but even 
these very general tenets are open for debate since liberal movements have generally rejected 
‘platforms’, ‘manifestos’ and ‘genealogies’.6 In recent decades such definitional problems 
have been exacerbated by stark regional differences. In many European countries ‘liberalism’ 
is strongly associated with free-market capitalism, liberal democracy and free enterprise; this 
means that it is routinely used as a term of abuse by members of left-wing parties and 
movements to describe those on the right. In the United States, on the other hand, ‘liberalism’ 
is associated with big government, progressive taxation, the welfare state and permissive 
social legislation; in an exact reversal of the European case it is those on the right who decry 
the dangerous liberalism of the left. Clearly, liberalism has common origins in an eighteenth-
century project to elevate rationality, freedom and human responsibility, but these 
pronounced (and growing) differences in meaning in the twenty-first century have made it 
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very difficult to write about liberalism without taking into account the meaning of the term on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  
 Surprisingly, the only one of these five books to take this challenge seriously is 
Edmund Fawcett’s engaging aperçu of the history of liberalism. Fawcett is a political 
journalist rather than a career academic, and this shows in his ability to cut through the 
minutiae of historiographical debate and head straight for the ‘story’ – which, in this case, is 
the ‘story’ of liberals as diverse as François Guizot, Samuel Smiles, Abraham Lincoln, David 
Lloyd George, John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich Hayek, Pierre Mendès France, Willy Brandt 
and Margaret Thatcher (to name but a few). Rather than get bogged down in a terminological 
minefield, Fawcett’s approach to the question ‘what is liberalism?’ consists of multiplying 
biographical sketches and anecdotes in the hope that eventually some kind of de facto 
definition emerges from the plethora of histories on show. For the most part, it makes for a 
persuasive – if sometimes rather disorientating – read. One cannot help but be impressed by 
Fawcett’s ecumenism. One could no doubt accuse him of methodological elitism but, within 
the elite, he leaves no stone unturned: his list includes academic intellectuals, American 
presidents, career politicians, economists and policy administrators. He is also refreshingly 
attuned to the diversity of liberal thinking in Western Europe and North America. He does 
not make the easy mistake of assuming that liberalism takes the same form everywhere and 
his wide reading on the subject means that he can speak knowledgeably about liberals in 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States without resorting to glib 
generalisations. 
So keen is Fawcett to dispense with any kind of bold conceptual claim that he urges 
impatient readers on the very first page of the book to ‘skip this explanatory introduction and 
go straight to the story’. But this genuine and useful desire to focus on individual liberal 
trajectories inevitably raises problems for both lay and expert readers who might be expecting 
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more from a book that purports to offer the ‘history of an idea’. At the most detailed level, the 
absence of any real schematic ‘definition’ of liberalism often leaves the reader wading 
through all kinds of information that has little to do with the political philosophy of the actors 
involved. It is interesting to know that George Eliot fell in love with Herbert Spencer or that 
Hayek contracted malaria at the end of the First World War, but these anecdotes do not get us 
much closer to understanding liberalism as an idea. Similarly, Fawcett’s commendable 
inclusivity makes for all sorts of strange bedfellows. For the post-war period alone, the 
decision to include figures like Jean-Paul Sartre or François Mitterrand in a book on 
liberalism seems to be stretching our definition to breaking point. It is true that Fawcett’s aim 
in bringing in these people is to explore the liberal aspects of their thought and practice, or 
simply to look at major actors who were in dialogue with liberalism throughout their careers. 
But it has the tendency to allow liberalism to swallow other ideologies and traditions. The 
claim, for instance, that republicanism was essentially another word for liberalism in late 
nineteenth-century France is a contentious one and downplays the importance of 
revolutionary, Jacobin and Napoleonic political traditions.7 Moving forward chronologically, 
the short section (245–67) that deals with liberal economists in the 1930s – Keynes, Irving 
Fisher and Hayek – is full of excellent details about these men and their work but fails to 
identify this period as a key schism in liberal visions of politics, with Keynes advocating a 
stronger state and Hayek endorsing a minimalist view.  
Early in the book Fawcett rejects the notion that there are ‘many liberalisms’.8 This 
allows him to draw on the ideas and biographies of a huge range of figures. But, for someone 
with such a bold methodological stance, he remains in thrall to the diversity of liberalism 
over time. The result is a book lacking in a theoretical core that gives meaning to the plethora 
of characters. One is left feeling that it might have been easier to begin with a specific case 
study of liberalism rather than Fawcett’s all-inclusive approach – and there are a number of 
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essays in other volumes that support this view. Perhaps the two best examples of conceptual 
frameworks derived from specific cases are the essays by Larry Siedentop and Lucien Jaume 
in Raf Geenens and Helena Rosenblatt’s edited volume on French liberalism.9 Spurred on by 
the widely held view that France has always had a ‘defective’ or ‘disabled’ liberal tradition, 
both Siedentop and Jaume offer useful, if schematic, models that we can use to understand 
how liberalism has developed.  
It was in the late 1970s that Siedentop first articulated his view that French liberal 
thought has always been more ‘historical’, more sensitive to ‘change’ and more concerned 
with ‘social structure’ than its Anglophone cousin, but the republication of his seminal essay 
in this volume is a welcome reminder of the prescience of his analysis.10 Siedentop’s claim 
has certainly been borne out by the very different shape of France’s liberal revival in the 
1970s compared with the neoliberal wave that swept North America and the United Kingdom 
at the same time.11 In some ways Jaume builds on Siedentop’s ideas, but he gives a distinct 
picture based on his knowledge of early nineteenth-century liberalism. For him there were 
three major strands to French liberalism – an ‘elitist form’ (favoured by thinkers like Guizot), 
a ‘constitutionalist and individualist form’ (favoured by thinkers like Benjamin Constant) and 
a liberal Catholic form (favoured by thinkers like Charles de Montalembert). Again, this 
offers a useful insight into the contours of French liberalism both in the nineteenth century 
and up to the present day. Most importantly, Siedentop’s dual structure and Jaume’s tripartite 
one show how a conceptual framework can help anchor our understanding of liberalism’s 
history.  
Yet even where a biographical or individual perspective seems appropriate, it does not 
have to lead to the dispersion and overlapping narratives of Fawcett’s book. Another 
approach is to look at the networks of sociability and friendship amongst liberals, which is 
exactly what some of the contributors to Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Niklas Olsen’s volume 
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try to do. For instance, Dieter Plehwe and Katja Walther adopt an explicitly social scientific 
network approach – using quantitative research and meticulous statistical mapping – to reveal 
the close-knit relationships amongst members of the Mont Pèlerin Society.12 The picture that 
emerges is one of a small group of devoted transnational academics who believed that their 
cohesiveness was crucial to their success. It was not simply the famous figures of Hayek and 
Milton Friedman who gave the group its strength; it was also the commitment of an ‘inner 
circle’ of members, many of whom are not well-known. Similarly, Ben Jackson adopts a 
parallel, though less quantitative approach, in his penetrating chapter on the ‘think-tank 
archipelago’ that lay behind the conversion of the UK Conservative Party to neoliberalism in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Here, too, ‘back channels and informal networks’ laid the foundation 
for the neoliberal onslaught. In Jackson’s view, it was friendship and peer pressure that 
ensured the spread of neoliberal ideas across the British elite.13  
The importance of networks to the persistence of liberalism raises an important 
question: what if liberalism is defined not so much by what it is but by the company it keeps? 
This would apply to both the ideologies that liberals have combined with liberalism 
(‘Christian’ liberalism, liberal ‘democracy’, ‘social’ liberalism. . .) and the kinds of places 
liberals have tended to congregate (universities, businesses, the upper echelons of state 
administrations. . .) In this reading liberalism is less an ideology than a sensibility – and one 
that is best cultivated in the boardroom or common room. This would certainly fit the 
traditional view that liberals prefer fraternising with each other rather than with the masses. 
And it would also explain why, when liberalism fails to persuade electors at the ballot box, it 
ends up being brought in through policy initiatives and technocratic injunctions.14 After all, if 
there is one thing that characterises liberalism – and this much is clear from Fawcett’s 
overview – it is a self-conscious intellectualism. Liberals’ commitment to the rational means 
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that they often have a stern, if not dismissive, attitude towards those less capable than 
themselves. 
 
The Limits of the Liberal Sensibility 
But what happens when the best laid liberal plans fall apart? What happens when the frontiers 
of liberalism are breached? There are countless examples of such moments in European and 
world history. French liberals watched in horror as their country descended into revolution 
and dictatorship in 1848, British liberals saw their delicate hold on politics swept away by the 
rise of the Labour Party in the middle decades of the twentieth century and liberals across 
Europe were appalled by the collapse of the rule of law and democracy in the interwar period. 
Apart from their intrinsic interest as points of abrupt ideological change, these moments also 
shed light on the meaning of liberalism, especially since liberals have often espoused 
‘moderation’ or ‘consensus’ in the face of illiberal forces.15 We can learn a great deal, not 
simply from the inner coherence of liberalism, but also from its outer edges. 
There can be few better case studies of liberal collapse than the subject of Steven E. 
Aschheim’s learned and powerful essays on the German-Jewish intellectual of the early 
twentieth century. Aschheim has spent much of his distinguished career examining the 
intellectual aspects of what is surely one of the greatest historiographical paradoxes of the 
modern age: how a highly ‘civilised’ and ‘learned’ Germany was seduced by Nazism and 
became the site of some of the twentieth century’s most gut-wrenching atrocities. By 
focusing on the German-Jewish experience, he pushes this paradox to its extreme. There is 
something excruciating about the lives of figures like Gershom Scholem, Victor Klemperer 
and Hannah Arendt. Like so many other European intellectuals of this period, they combined 
extraordinary multi-lingual and transnational learning with an acute sense for the most 
pressing issues of their day and a more or less open arrogance towards ‘lesser’ peoples or 
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cultures. Except that they lived to witness the almost complete extermination of their 
community at the hands of the Germanic civilisation that they had elevated above all others. 
In the face of the Holocaust, even the cultivated liberalism of German-Jewish intellectuals 
could not survive. 
In many ways, the Aschheim essays under review here (all of which were previously 
published between 2001 and 2011) are not really about liberalism at all. Instead, they cover a 
vast canvas, ranging from early Zionism and conceptions of evil to German–Jewish theatre 
and the nature of the intellectual. Nevertheless, they give us important insights into the frayed 
edges of liberalism where its contradictions become most apparent. To take but one example, 
in his chapter on orientalism Aschheim describes how early twentieth-century bourgeois Jews 
sought to emancipate themselves from European anti-Semitism, sometimes by turning to 
Zionism, but also by simultaneously adopting the imperial prejudices of their non-Jewish 
liberal counterparts. They looked down on their ‘Eastern’ or ‘Asian’ roots and repeatedly 
dismissed the Arab culture of the Middle East.16 Still today many Zionist ideologues in Israel 
cling to the same liberal orientalist contradictions as their predecessors. This is a salutary 
reminder that ideas of liberal emancipation – just like ideas of liberal democracy – are 
unevenly applied across the world.   
Aschheim’s essays draw our attention to another key tension within liberalism: the 
yawning gap between liberal theory and liberal practice. Many of the Central European 
Jewish bourgeoisie were deeply attached to the rational, enquiring and tolerant liberalism of 
the nineteenth century. However, by the 1930s they were – as Eric Hobsbawm memorably 
described it in his memoirs – living on borrowed time.17 There was no place for genteel 
liberalism in an age of brittle political polarisation, and Aschheim notes how young Jewish 
intellectuals who came of age after the First World War were seduced away from liberalism 
towards Marxism or Zionism. With the rise of Nazism, the Great Depression and the collapse 
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of the Popular Fronts in Spain and France, the last hopes for a liberal solution to the interwar 
crisis were extinguished; liberalism seemed to have vanished for good. The conclusion was 
clear: when faced with a pressing reality, the grand ideas of liberalism were far weaker than 
its practical manifestations.18  
Although Britain was largely spared the ideological cataclysm that hit continental 
Europe in the interwar period, there were numerous echoes of liberalism’s decline. While the 
period before the First World War saw the triumph of New Liberalism after 1906, the 
interwar years became increasingly bleak for the party, culminating in the complete electoral 
collapse of 1924, when the Liberals gained only forty seats. With the exception of the 
National Government in the early 1930s, the Liberal Party would never again be part of 
government until the 2010 coalition between Liberal Democrats and Conservatives. Yet, 
despite this lengthy period in the wilderness, Peter Sloman’s careful and well-documented 
examination of the Liberal Party’s economic policies from the mid-1920s to the mid-1960s 
suggests that there was more to British liberalism than its electoral failure. On the contrary, 
the party became a forum for economic policy discussions, most of which revolved around 
the nature and extent of state intervention. Using an extensive array of primary sources, 
Sloman reconstructs the varieties of economic thinking that crossed the party, from the 1928 
‘Yellow Book’ that advocated something like a British New Deal, to the more individualist 
temptations of the 1960s.  
Understandably, in a close-grained study of this kind, Sloman does not offer many 
grand conceptual conclusions; that is not the purpose of his book. He nevertheless gives us an 
additional perspective on the boundaries of liberalism in the twentieth century. In particular, 
his work reinforces the disjunction between liberal ideas and practice. In the middle decades 
of the twentieth century, British liberals were exposed to a wide range of economic ideas and 
formed, at least in theory, a vibrant intellectual community. But they were singularly unable 
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to translate this into electoral success or even have any significant impact on the economic 
policy of the period. Outflanked by the Labour Party’s commitment to state socialism –
especially after 1945 – liberals struggled to construct an alternative platform. Even when 
liberalism came back into fashion in the 1970s, it was not the Liberals but the Conservatives 
who embraced it.   
What explains this fragility of liberalism when faced with political power? Sloman, 
who focuses specifically on Britain, suggests that it was a classic combination of 
factionalism, ideological confusion and poor leadership. By contrast, Siedentop and Jean-
Fabien Spitz’s essays in the Geenens and Rosenblatt volume take a more philosophical 
approach. They argue that the problem with (French) liberals in the nineteenth century was 
their inadequate conception of the ‘social’. In order to explain social change, French liberals 
therefore needed to draw on other political ideas, which ended up ‘diluting’ – or, at the very 
least, modifying – French liberalism and making it more vulnerable to ideologies that 
emphasised the social above all else (such as Communism or Gaullism).19 Finally, 
Aschheim’s work suggests a deeper reason for liberalism’s failures. For the German-Jewish 
intellectuals that are the subject of his essays, it is almost as if liberalism was an insufficiently 
emotional worldview. It offered a rational foundation for the bourgeois European intellectual, 
but it could not speak to the moral dilemmas of early twentieth-century Judaism like Zionism 
or Marxism. A scholar of liberalism like Aurelian Craiutu – whose essay on Raymond Aron’s 
‘moderation’ appears in Geenens and Rosenblatt’s book – would no doubt argue that it is 
precisely this ability to temper emotions that marks liberalism out from other ideologies.20 
But Aschheim’s fundamental point remains: one of the most powerful frontiers of liberalism 
is emotional. At times of crisis, the unwillingness of liberals to appeal to what Tocqueville 
and later François Furet called the ‘passions’ has often led to its complete collapse.21 
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The Genealogies of Neoliberalism  
After a long period when it was out of fashion in both the Western world and the (then) Third 
World, liberalism made a spectacular comeback in the late 1970s. Indeed, so impressive was 
the revival that it gave birth to a new political ideology: neoliberalism. Based on a radically 
individualist reading of the liberal tradition, neoliberals defended the value of individual 
enterprise, the free market and the small state. Led by economists like Friedman and 
philosophers like Hayek and Ayn Rand, neoliberalism first penetrated the political systems of 
the United Kingdom and the United States in the late 1970s – under the patronage of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan respectively – before spreading all over the world.22 
By the 1990s critics could legitimately cast neoliberalism as a truly global ideology, with its 
principles understood by policy makers and politicians from Santiago de Chile to Bombay. 
Such a reversal of fortunes in the liberal story could not have been predicted. By the late 
1960s there were numerous indications that collectivist ideologies were under attack from 
young student radicals and disgruntled middle-managers, but this did not automatically mean 
that liberalism was the answer. Many more elements were needed in order to make 
neoliberalism into a dominant mode of thinking all over the world. 
The question of how the European and American liberal traditions transformed 
themselves into what we now recognise as neoliberalism is surely one of the great questions 
of modern political history. Yet, despite some fascinating work on related subjects, relatively 
little has been written on the subject by scholars of liberalism.23 Some of this is no doubt 
political. Many scholars of liberalism are clearly uncomfortable with aggressive neoliberal 
individualism and prefer to draw a clear distinction between, say, the ‘Chicago Boys’ of the 
1970s and the more socially-orientated liberalism of a Tocqueville or a Hobhouse. To his 
credit, Fawcett does not do this. In his grand overview of liberalism, he treats Friedman, 
Hayek, Reagan and others alongside everyone else – as representatives of a global liberal 
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tradition. But his biographical approach offers only limited clues as to why neoliberalism was 
so successful. For more detailed insights, we need to look elsewhere.  
The first major challenge is to explain the dissemination of neoliberal ideas. Several 
of the essays in the Schulz-Forberg and Olsen volume tackle this issue with varying degrees 
of success. Jackson’s aforementioned chapter on the role of think tanks in the 1970s in the 
United Kingdom is probably the best of these as it combines empirical work with a strong 
theoretical claim about the way neoliberalism penetrated the British elite. Jackson’s 
conclusions are supported by Olsen’s intriguing biography of the Danish neoliberal 
economist Christian Gandil.24 Gandil was the only member of the Mont Pèlerin Society to 
attend all of its twenty-four conferences between 1946 and 1987 and was a tireless advocate 
of neoliberal economic policies. Not surprisingly, Gandil’s solutions were largely ignored in 
his home country; Denmark’s strong post-war social democratic and Keynesian consensus 
was not conducive to the penetration of neoliberal ideas. Nevertheless, Gandil provides a link 
between older forms of neoliberalism from the 1940s and the resurgent neoliberalism of the 
1980s. And, while Olsen is clear that Gandil himself did little to shape contemporary neo-
liberalism, the expression he uses to describe him (‘a second-hand dealer in ideas’) is 
suggestive. As our understanding of neoliberalism develops in future, a good deal of attention 
is likely to focus on precisely these kinds of people. After all, it is not a few star thinkers who 
have made a hitherto marginal strand of liberalism into its pre-eminent expression, it is the 
vast army of ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’. They may not make for the most edifying subject 
matter, but any attempt to explain the dissemination of neoliberalism will require a 
multifaceted study of the middle managers, management consultants and university 
administrators who speak its ideas every day. 
The second major problem in the study of neoliberalism is the ideological context in 
which it developed. Those who argue that neoliberalism represents a new ‘spirit of 
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capitalism’ or a new ‘rationality’ tend to draw a straight line from Adam Smith to Alan 
Greenspan.25 But this ignores the profound ideological changes that occurred in the 1970s. 
Unfortunately, very little of the research on show here has anything to say about this. There is 
nothing on the collapse of a Marxist consensus amongst Europe’s intelligentsia and the 
fragmentation of post-civil rights liberalism in the United States, both of which opened new 
intellectual spaces for more radical forms of liberalism.26 There is also very little on the turn 
away from Keynesian economic policies in Europe and the rise of ‘anti-government’ 
Republicanism in the United States, except brief mentions in Fawcett’s book.27 The only 
contribution that enlarges our perspective on the intellectual contexts for the emergence of 
neoliberalism is Samuel Moyn’s short chapter on the French debate on ‘rights’ in the 1980s.28 
By analysing the writings of Claude Lefort and his student Marcel Gauchet, Moyn explores 
whether the growth of rights discourse in France in this period can be described as ‘liberal’. 
His answer is ambiguous. On the one hand, the desire to rehabilitate rights was an attempt to 
elaborate a post-Marxist framework for ethical politics – one that might be described as 
‘liberal’; on the other, both Lefort and Gauchet were sceptical of the individualist 
underpinnings of rights talk. This scepticism ran counter to the neoliberal revival that was 
taking place at the time.   
Moyn’s analysis points to the urgent need for further study of how neoliberalism 
interacted with the fractured and shifting ideological landscape of the 1970s.29 The cliché – 
especially prevalent in France – that the ’68 generation went from student radicals to 
investment bankers implies that it was a story of substitution (of neoliberalism for radical 
leftism) and disillusionment (with revolutionary politics).30 But this obscures a myriad of 
other engagements and positions. It also forgets the non-Western variant of this story, 
something of which all the publications under review are guilty.31 Because, despite what anti-
capitalist thinkers have argued, neoliberalism is not simply a Western construct; it has been 
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adopted all over the world. Inevitably, it has been a tool of neo-imperialism – one thinks of 
the IMF’s structural adjustment policies of the 1990s or even the budgetary austerity imposed 
on Europe since 2008 – but this does not mean that neoliberalism ‘belongs’ exclusively to the 
West. From Augusto Pinochet to Narendra Modi, neoliberalism has taken on specific and 
powerful local variants. If we are to explain how and why we live in a neoliberal world, we 
must broaden our horizons. 
This raises a subsidiary question: is it really possible to write the history of liberalism 
without also writing a history of anti-liberalism?32 The books and articles here 
overwhelmingly paint a picture of a liberalism thwarted by circumstance and undone by its 
lack of killer instinct, while liberals continuously appear to be apologising for themselves. 
Such a skewed view is not necessarily inaccurate. Sloman, in particular, makes an eloquent 
case for a British liberalism lost at sea in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Yet it 
is obvious that for liberalism to survive the better part of three centuries it has had to be more 
than simply an apologia for rational thinking and sensible government; it has also had to 
defend or impose itself on its enemies. The history of liberalism would look rather different if 
it included, say, Tocqueville’s profound attachment to liberalism despite the increasingly 
illiberal politics of nineteenth-century France, Aron’s determination to stand by his liberal 
beliefs in the face of overwhelming opposition from his intellectual peers or the brutal 
imposition of neoliberal economic policies on recalcitrant indigenous populations in Latin 
America and India. Seen this way, liberalism is – and always has been – a rather confident 
ideology. Its theoreticians have been (mostly) men of high intellect and wide learning. Its 
standard-bearers have been people who believe deeply in the value of progress, even when 
this has excluded ‘lesser’ or ‘backward’ peoples. And liberalism itself has largely remained a 
seductive combination of forward-looking rational utopianism and stodgy pragmatism.  
 17 
School of History, Classics and Archaeology, William Robertson Wing, Teviot Place, 
Edinburgh EH8 9AG; emile.chabal@ed.ac.uk 
1 On the umbilical relationship between financial capitalism and neoliberalism, see for 
instance Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, The Crisis of Neoliberalism (London: 
Harvard University Press, 2013). 
2 On this, see for example Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism 
in Britain and France (London: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
3 This triumphalism is best exemplified by the now famous Francis Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992). 
4 France is a good example of this, as I will discuss later. 
5 This is in sharp contrast to recent powerful indictments of liberalism such as Domenico 
Losurdo, Liberalism: A Counter-History (London: Verso, 2014). 
6 Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (London: Oxford University Press, 
2015) is the most recent attempt to grapple with these definitional issues in a succinct way. In 
his words, liberalism is an ideology that is ‘a rallying cry for individuals desiring space to be 
free from unjustifiable limitations’, ‘a set of fundamental institutional arrangements meant to 
legitimate and civilize the practices of politics’ and ‘ideas and policies intended to reform, to 
emancipate, and to open up possibilities for individuals wishing to live their lives according 
to their own understandings’ (2). 
7 He makes this argument in Edmund Fawcett, Liberalism: The Life of an Idea (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 160. There is now a vibrant discussion about the 
relationship between republicanism and liberalism in post-revolutionary French history. 
Varied approaches to this issue include Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern 
France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics 
After the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism (London: Cornell University 
Press, 2008) and Emile Chabal, A Divided Republic: Nation, State and Citizenship in 
Contemporary France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
8 Fawcett, Liberalism, 26. 
9 Larry Siedentop, ‘Two liberal traditions’ and Lucien Jaume, ‘The unity, diversity and 
paradoxes of French liberalism’ in Raf Geenens and Helena Rosenblatt (eds.), French 
Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
                                                          
 18 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Siedentop’s piece was originally published in Alan Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: 
Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
11 On the French liberal revival, see for example Mark Lilla (ed.), New French Thought: 
Political Philosophy (London: Princeton University Press, 1994); Andrew Jainchill and 
Samuel Moyn, ‘French Democracy Between Totalitarianism and Solidarity: Pierre 
Rosanvallon and Revisionist Historiography’ in The Journal of Modern History, 76 (2004), 
107–154 and Chabal, A Divided Republic, especially chapters 6–7. 
12 Dieter Plehwe and Katja Walther, ‘In the Shadows of Hayek and Firedman: Quantitative 
Analysis as an Exploratory Instrument in Socio-Historic Network Research’, in Hagen 
Schulz-Forberg and Niklas Olsen (eds.), Re-Inventing Western Civilisation: Transnational 
Reconstructions of Liberalism in Europe in the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2014). 
13 Ben Jackson, ‘The Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neoliberalism’ in Schulz-
Forberg and Olsen, Re-Inventing Western Civilisation. 
14 For an interesting perspective on power and its dissemination, see David Priestland, 
Merchant, Soldier, Sage: A New History of Power (London: Penguin, 2013). 
15 Ideas of liberal moderation have been most thoroughly historicised in Aurelian Craiutu, A 
Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1748–1830 (London: 
Princeton University Press, 2012). 
16 Steven E. Aschheim, At the Edges of Liberalism: Junctions of European, German and 
Jewish History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 23–4. 
17 Eric Hobsbawm, Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life (London: Penguin, 2002), 
especially chapter 2. 
18 This narrative of interwar political collapse and the failure of both liberalism and 
democracy is at the heart of Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century 
(London: Penguin, 1999). 
19 Siedentop, ‘Two Liberal Traditions’ and Jean-Fabien Spitz, ‘The “illiberalism” of French 
liberalism: the individual and the state in the thought of Blanc, Dupont White and Durkheim’, 
in Geenens and Rosenblatt, French Liberalism. 
20 Aurelian Craiutu, ‘Raymond Aron and the tradition of political moderation in France’, in 
Geenens and Rosenblatt, French Liberalism. 
21 On Furet (and Tocqueville’s) use of the idea of political ‘passion’, see Christophe 
Prochasson, ‘The Melancholy of Post-Communism: François Furet and the “Passions”’, in 
 19 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Emile Chabal (ed.), France since the 1970s: History, Politics and Memory in an Age of 
Uncertainty (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). 
22 Accounts of the rise of neoliberalism include Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy, 
Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
23 Some of the best close-grained, empirical work has been done by Serge Audier and 
Michael Behrent. See for instance Serge Audier, Néolibéralismes: une archéologie 
intellectuelle (Paris: Grasset, 2012); Serge Audier, Penser le ‘néolibéralisme’. Le moment 
néolibéral, Foucault et la crise du socialisme (Paris: Le Bord de l’Eau, 2015); Michael C. 
Behrent, ‘Liberalism without humanism: Michel Foucault and the Free-Market Creed, 1976–
1979’, in Modern Intellectual History 6, 3 (2009), 539–68; and Michael C. Behrent, 
‘Justifying Capitalism in an Age of Uncertainty: L’Association pour la Liberté Économique 
et le Progrès Social, 1969–1973’, in Chabal, France since the 1970s. 
24 Niklas Olsen, ‘A Second-Hand Dealer in Ideas: Christian Gandil and Scandinavian 
Configurations of European Neolibealism, 1945–1970’, in Schulz-Forberg and Olsen, Re-
inventing Western Civilisation.  
25 This narrative is often heard amongst members of anti-globalisation and far-left 
movements. It can also be found in books such as Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, The 
New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society (London: Verso, 2014). The expression ‘new 
spirit of capitalism’ is taken from Christian Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of 
Capitalism (London: Verso, 2007), although Boltanski and Chiapello focus more on 
capitalism than neoliberalism in their study. 
26 One of the few historians to take these changes seriously is Daniel T. Rodgers, whose 
pioneering book offers an excellent template for how the intellectual history of the 
contemporary period can be written. Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (London: Harvard 
University Press, 2012). 
27 Fawcett, Liberalism, 383. 
28 Samuel Moyn, ‘The politics of individual rights: Marcel Gauchet and Claude Lefort’, in 
Geenens and Rosenblatt, French Liberalism. 
29 Moyn himself has done this for ‘human rights’ in Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human 
Rights in History (London: Harvard University Press, 2012). His argument is that the rise of 
‘human rights’ is inextricably linked to the ideological transformations of the 1970s. 
30 This has been a common refrain in post-1968 French writing about the student protests of 
the late 1960s. Perhaps the most famous example of this narrative is Régis Debray, Modeste 
 20 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
contribution aux discours et cérémonies officielles du dixième anniversaire (Paris: Maspéro, 
1978), but there are echoes of it in Boltanski and Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism. 
31 European and North American historians still do not have a good grasp over the non-
Western varieties of contemporary neoliberalism, but they have begun to investigate earlier 
forms of non-Western liberalism. See for example Christopher Bayly, Recovering Liberties: 
Indian Thought in an Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
32 I develop this idea in Emile Chabal, ‘Capitalism and its Critics: Antiliberalism in 
Contemporary French Politics’ in Iain Stewart and Stephen Sawyer (eds.), In Search of the 
Liberal Moment: Democracy, Anti-Totalitarianism, and Intellectual Politics in France since 
1950 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016). 
